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Abstract 
This thesis considers the problem of game theory application in resilience-based 
road-bridge transportation network. Bridges in a community may be owned and 
maintained by separated entities. These owners may have different and even competing 
objectives for the recovering the transportation system after disaster. In this work, we 
assume that each player attempts to minimize the repair time of damaged bridges after 
hazards happen. The problem is modeled as an N-player nonzero-sum game. Strategic 
form and sequential form game are designed to demonstrate methodology.  A genetic 
algorithm is applied to the computation of the problem. A dataset with hypothetical road-
bridge network with 46 nodes and 26 bridges subjected to a scenario seismic event is used 
to illustrate the proposed methodology. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In road-bridge transportation systems, bridges are especially vulnerable to disaster 
(e.g. earthquake, flood, terrorism, etc.). In 2013, there were 607,380 bridges in the United 
States. These bridges provide access to roads leading to hospitals, police stations, 
firehouses, etc., or they might be critical to the economic vitality of the community.  The 
Wenchuan earthquake in 2008 damaged 1,657 bridges in China (Zhuang, et al., 2009). 
Democracy Bridge, which spans the Hondura’s largest river, the Ulua, collapsed in the 
earthquake in 2009. The bridge is one of two which connect the northern city of San Pedro 
Sula, Hondura’s second-largest city, with the rest of the country. Determining which 
bridges in a community are the most important and should be repaired is a basic problem.  
However, it turns out that bridges of a transportation system in a community are 
not all controlled by a single entity. In fact, a portion of in the community might be owned 
by the federal government, another set of bridges may be owned by the state, and the 
others may be owned by the county or other local entities. Different entities might make 
decisions based on their best interests. One can imagine that a finite number of bridges 
owners repair their bridges based on their unique priorities. In such a situation, these 
owners may compete for the same resources (e.g. construction workers, repair material) 
and attempt to minimize the repair time for their own bridges. How to balance the 
competition among different owners to achieve the best interest for the community is the 
goal of this paper.  
 A growing number of literature has been published about mitigating the hazards 
of transportation system in a community (Murray-Tuite, 2006; Ta et al., 2009; Cox et al., 
2011; Frangopol and Bocchini, 2011; Ip and Wang, 2011; Cetinkaya et al., 2015; Zhang 
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and Wang, 2016; Zhang et al., 2017a). To the best of our knowledge, none of these studies 
has attempted to consider whether the different ownership of bridges in the network 
impact the final result. These studies are based on the implicit assumption of an existing 
centralized decision maker with sufficient authority to implement an optimal recovery 
schedule. The overwhelming majority of roads and bridges are owned and maintained by 
state and local governments in the US. Federally maintained roads and bridges are 
generally funded only on federal lands and at federal facilities (like military bases). There 
are also many local private roads, generally serving remote and insulated residences. In 
most cases, entities have different priorities and interests regarding the maintenance and 
repair.   
This thesis will focus on repairing bridges owned by different entities during the 
post-disaster period. As a simplification, we will only consider one competing resource 
to be shared by multi-owners of transportation components in a community, i.e.  available 
repair crews. This work will extend previous work by Zhang et al., 2017a and Zhang et 
al., 2017b to adopt both the transportation network performance metric they introduce as 
well as the overall objective function for decision-making during recovery to handle 
multiple owners. The result of this study illustrates the application by using game theory 
to determine an optimal repair schedule for each entity of damaged bridges of a 
community during post-disaster recovery period.  
The remainder of this thesis will be divided into 4 chapters. Chapter 2 summarizes 
the literature related to the resilience of post-disaster road-bridge transportation. Chapter 
3 describes methodology and defines the measures used to apply game theory to the road-
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bridge network. Chapter 4 discusses the result of the methodology applied to the sample 
case with different scenarios. Chapter 5 provides conclusions based on the work.  
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Chapter 2: Background 
2.1 Transportation system performance 
Current approach for transportation network problems consider sole ownership of 
transportation components for the decision-making.  
Chang and Nojima (2001) proposed three performance measures for 
transportation system of post-disaster situation: total length of network open, total 
distance-based accessibility and areal distance-based accessibility. The transportation 
network used in this paper includes railway lines and highways. The paper provides a 
quantifiable method to evaluate the performance of a transportation system in the post-
disaster stage. However, their approach is from the global perspective and does not allow 
for unique perspective of different decision makers. Ip and Wang (2011) introduce a 
quantifiable evaluation approach for resilience. Resilience, defined as the weighted sum 
of the resilience of all nodes, and friability, defined as the reduction of network resilience 
resulting from its removal from the network, are discussed to measure the performance 
of the network. Their approach measuring the network performance is based on the 
assumption that there is sole decision-maker in the network.  Zhang, et al., (2017a) 
presents two metrics for measuring performance of network: total recovery time(TRT) 
and the skew of the recovery time trajectory (SRT). A recent research from Zhang, et al., 
(2017b), develops a stage-wide decision framework for transportation network. This 
study defines three network metrics, reliability weighted IPW (RIPW), emergency node-
weighted IPW (EIPW) and traffic weighted (TIPW), each based on a derivation of the 
number of independent pathways (IPW) within a roadway system, to measure the 
performance of a network in term of its robustness, redundancy, and recoverability, 
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respectively (Zhang, et al., 2017). Again, these two approaches assume a centralized 
authority for making decision. In this paper, we will extend the concept of SRT to 
multiple owners. Additionally, this is accomplished by the novel contribution of modified 
TIPW to also be owner specific.  
These studies all present quantifiable evaluation approaches for resilience based 
on the sole ownership of each components of network, but in reality, each component 
(roadways, bridges, storm drainages, roadways signs, etc.) of transportation network is 
assigned to specific entities for certain responsibilities (maintenance, repairing, etc.). On 
other hand, game theory, is set of tools to model interaction between decision makers 
with conflicting interests. Game theory is used widely in economics, political science and 
psychology. Now computer scientists and engineers are using it to rethink their work. 
There are an increasing number of studies to apply game theory in supply chain (Li et al 
2013, Mohebbi et al., 2015), cyber security (Backhaus et al., 2013), transportation 
network (Bell 2000, Bell 2001, Szeto 2011, Wang et., al 2013). So far, there is no 
researches or studies to apply game theory to road-bridges transportation of resilience. 
This is the motivation of this study.  
2.2 Game Setting 
In game theory, a player’s strategy is a complete plan of actions he or she can 
choose in a given circumstance that might arise within the game.  In road-bridges 
transportation system, different entities controlling the bridges, roads or other 
components, are players (that are modeled as bridges owners) of this game setting.  
In a non-cooperative game, each player 𝑖	(𝑖 = 1…𝑁) chooses a strategy 𝑎*  from 
a strategy set 𝐴*, and the payoffs of the game are given by the mapping where 
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𝑢* 𝑎-, … 𝑎/  is player 𝑖′𝑠 payoff if strategies 𝑎-, … 𝑎/  are played. The standard 
prediction for what will happen in game us that players will choose Nash equilibrium 
strategies. Strategies (𝑎-∗ 	… 𝑎/∗ ) constitute a Nash equilibrium if: 
 𝑢* 𝑎-∗, … 𝑎/∗ ≥ 	𝑎* 𝑎, … 𝑎, 𝑎*∗, 𝑎*4-∗ , … 𝑎/∗ , ∀𝑖	 ∈ 𝑁	and  𝑎*	 ∈ 	𝐴*      
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no player can be better off by deviating 
from it, assuming that the other players do not change their strategies. This leads to the 
situations where only one player changes his own decision while the others stick to their 
current choices. In this game, the goal for all bridge owners (local, state, federal 
government and private owners), is to minimize the skewness of total recovery 
trajectory(SRT), which is the payoff for each player. In order to achieve this goal, all 
bridges owners have to find a repair schedule, which can give minimum value of SRT.  
 This game can be formulated as an N players non−zero sum, non−cooperative 
and repeated game. Application of this type of game formulation can be found in other 





Chapter 3: Methodology  
There are three stages of resilience according to Zhang et., al 2017b: Mitigation, 
Emergency response and Recovery, as illustrated in their work and represented here as 
Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1 Stages of resilience 
 
Zhang et., al 2017b propose that the various stages of the resilience timeline 
having distinct performance metrics, objectives and constrains.  In stage I, the purpose of 
mitigation is to “enhance” the community in preparation for a disaster. The community 
faces the challenge how to allocate the budgets for enhancement. In stage II, the priority 
for a community is coping with the emergency. In this stage, given the time urgency and 
life-safety threatening environment, they assume that owners of bridge cooperate with 
each other to fix the bridges which lead to emergency service such as hospital, firehouse 
or police station, etc. For stage III, the community focuses on the recovery after disaster 
and there is no life and death situations. Therefore, bridge owners can repair bridges 
according to their own agenda. During the recovery stage, the community might face a 
shortage of construction crews or other resources because of the hazard, which might be 
worse if different owners compete for limited resources. Given that stage III usually is 
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much longer than stage II, and the urgency is reduced, the various owner may pursue their 
own best interests. The focus of this paper relates specifically to stage III. This section 
will elaborate how to find the scheduling solution, which is a repair schedule of damaged 
bridges, for each owner.  
During the post - disaster recovery period, the objective is to restore the 
transportation system to the pre-disaster condition with minimized total time and 
maximized efficiency for the transportation system (Zhang et al., 2017). For all bridge 
owners, the goal of post - disaster is to repair their bridges with maximized efficiency. 
All bridges within the network has an estimated repair time associated with different 
degrees of damage. For instance, bridge 515 is slightly damaged, the repair time is 3 days. 
But if the bridge is completely damaged, the repair time is 678 days. 
3.1 Performance metrics of network 
A transportation network is described on a undirected graph 𝐺 = 	𝑉, 𝐸 	where  
𝑉 = 1,2, … , 𝑛  is the set of nodes and 𝐸 = {1, 2, … ,𝑚} is the set of edges. Each edge 
presents a road with a maximum of one bridge. A pathway between an origin-destination 
(O – D) pair usually consists of several edges that represent roads, with or without a 
bridge, which are connected in series. Two pathways between the same O – D pair are 
considered as independent pathways (IPW) if they do not share any common road link. 
Figure 2 presents a pathway between O − D. IPW of this pathway is 1 since edges 1 − 2 
and 5	−	6 are shared by both path 1 – 2 – 3 – 5 – 6 and 1 – 2 – 4 – 5 – 6.  
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Figure 2 Example of IPW 
 
To identify the IPW among bridge owner in a same pair O	−	D, a binary variable 
𝐺@	is introduced. 𝐺@ (where o is the bridge owner of the network) is defined as an IPW 
indication for owner o. If owner o owns any of bridges on an independent pathway 
between O	−	D, the value of  𝐺@ is 1, otherwise, the value is 0.  For example, the 1	−	6 
pair in Figure 3, contains two paths from node1 to node 6. We assume that there are 
maximum one bridges per edge, marked as a or b which indicate owner of the bridge. 
Owner a owns bridges on the path 1 – 2 – 3 – 5 – 6, therefore 𝐺A = 1. Same calculation 
applies to owner b, and 𝐺B = 1. 
 
Figure 3 Calculation of IPW for each owner 
 
The identification of IPWs between many O – D pairs is non-unique, depending 
on the algorithm or process used to search for IPWs. To mitigate this problem, we apply 
Dijkstra’s algorithm (Skiena, 1990) to search for a succession of shortest independent 
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paths. The justification for the shortest IPW is that people often have a preference to 
choose the shortest path when traveling. If all edges have the same length for a shortest 
path search, for example, in Figure 4, the IPW from node 1 to node 5 is 3, which shows 
three independent pathways between 1 and 5. We assume that each edge has exactly one 
bridge, which marked in the Figure 4 as a, b and c to denote different bridge owner. One 
approach to select shortest path for this situation is random selection. However, in order 
to select the IPW, which incentivizes the bridge owner a to do the repair, the length of 
edge with bridge owned by owner a will be set as 0.9999. Pathway 1	−	2	−	5 becomes 
shortest path comparing with 1	−	3	− 5 and 1−	4	−	5.  For owner a, IPW is 1 since owner 
a owns one of the bridges in an independent pathway. Owner b owns one bridge on 
pathway 1	−	3	−	5, therefore IPW for owner b is 1. For owner c, IPW is 3 since owner c 
owns bridges on all three pathways 1	−	2	−	5, 1	−	3	−	5 and 1	−	4	−	5. 
 
Figure 4 Find shortest path based on different owners 
 
Let 𝐾*D denote the total number of IPWs and 𝑃*DF	denote the 𝑘HI IPW between node 
𝑖 ∈ 𝑉	and 𝑗	 ∈ 𝑉. An algorithm for computing 𝐾*D  and 𝑃*D between all nodes pairs is 
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introduced in Zhang et al (2016). Let 𝐼𝑃𝑊*,@ denote the average number of IPWs for 
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The IPW of network G for owner o is defined as the overall average of all 𝐼𝑃𝑊*,@ 










            
The performance metric for long-term recovery proposed by Zhang et al (2017b) 
is Traffic Weighted IPW, denoted as TIPW. The pre - event average daily traffic (ADT) 
on roads and bridges are the field measurements routinely maintained by the Federal or 
State Department of Transportation. TIPW is related to both the average daily traffic 
(ADT) and the length of the IPW and reflects the relative impact that this pathway has on 
people’s normal life activities and the local economy. Pathways between any given O –
D pair that has the shorter length and carries larger traffic flow contribute more to the 
network functionality.  ADT data is often readily available with federal, state or local 
bridges owners, or can be estimated using traffic assignment models. 𝐴Q is defined as the 
ADT of edge 𝑙	 ∈ 	𝑃*DS . 𝐴*DS  is the ADT of 𝑃*DS , which is the minimum ADT of all edges on 
the pathway, i.e.: 
𝐴*DS = min 𝐴Q 𝑙	 ∈ 𝑃*DS} (3) 
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For each edge 𝑙 ∈ 𝐸, the service level is defined as (1 −	Z[
\
 ) as used in Zhang et al 
(2016) and described in Table 1. If an edge is completely damaged, the value of  𝑑Q will 
be set to 4 and the corresponding service level will be 0. Let 𝑄*,@ denote the TIPW of 


















TIPW of the network for owner o can be described as: 










Table 1 Service level of bridges 
𝑑Q Description 
0 No damaged 
1 Slight damaged 
2 Moderate damaged 
3 Extensive damaged 
4 Complete damaged 
 








Table 2 Summary of formulation 
Notation/Term Description 
G (V, E) Undirected graph 
𝑉 = 	1,2, … , 𝑛  Set of nodes 
𝐸 = {1, 2, … ,𝑚} Set of edges  
𝐺@ 
Binary variable parameter to differentiate ownership of 
bridge, o = bridge owner 
𝐾*D Total number of IPWs  
𝑃*DF 𝑘HI IPW between node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉	and 𝑗	 ∈ 𝑉 
𝐼𝑃𝑊*,@ 
Independent pathway for owner o between node 𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 and 
all the other n-1 nodes 
𝐼𝑃𝑊@(𝐺) 
The IPW of network G for owner o is defined as the overall 
average of all 𝐼𝑃𝑊*,@ 
𝐴Q ADT of edge 𝑙	 ∈ 	𝑃*DS  
𝐴*DS  ADT of 𝑃*DS  
𝑄*,@ denote the TIPW of node 𝑖	 ∈ 𝑉 for owner o 
𝑄@ 𝐺  TIPW of the network for owner o 
 
 3.2 Game Theory Model Formulation 
 For each owner, his interest focuses on repairing damaged bridges in order to 
minimize the SRT.  If there is only one owner in the network, the problem can be solved 
by using optimization. But as we mentioned in Chapter 1, normally there are more than 
one owner involved to make decision. Game theory is a tool developed to find optimal 
results for more than one decision maker in the game. We shall employ the following 
notation: 
𝐼 = {1,…… ,𝑁}, denoting the set of players,  
𝑆*= the strategy set of player 𝑖 
𝑆O*= the strategy set of all players, except player 𝑖 
𝑢*= the payoff function of player 𝑖  
We define that set of player is the bridge owners of the network.  Player i′s strategy Se is 
the repair sequence of damaged bridges. For example, player 1 has four damaged bridges 
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and each bridge requires a certain number of days to be restored certain days to the level 
of pre-event.  He has 4! = 24	ways to schedule the repair. However, both recovery time 
and skewness of recovery trajectory might be different in each case. Zhang et al (2017b) 
explain that total recovery time alone is not sufficient to evaluate the efficiency of the 
network performance, which is partially encapsulated in the shape of the recovery 
trajectory. The skewness of recovery trajectory (SRT) apparently is a superior objective 
performance metric. To find the payoff for each player, we use skewness of recovery 
trajectory (SRT), defined as centroid of the area below the recovery trajectory as utility 
function instead of repairing time. In Figure 4, the recovery trajectory is defined from 
𝑡h to 𝑡S. The SRT associated with schedules 1 and 2 are marked in Figure 5 as 𝑠- and 𝑠i, 
respectively.  If the recovery were instantaneous, then 𝑠- = 𝑠i = 0. Schedule 1 and 2 
approximately lead to same recovery time, but schedule 1 is more efficient than schedule 
2.  
  
Figure 5 SRT of network performance 
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 The network SRT associated with the scheduling plan, the centroid of the area 
under the recovery trajectory as shown in Figure 5, can be calculated by Equation (7), 
which requires the integrals of TIPW, i.e. 𝑄@ 𝑡 , as a function of time. As discussed 
previously, computing TIPW involves using Dijkstra’s algorithm to search for IPWs for 
all O−D pairs. TIPW is estimated at discrete points in time; consequently, the recovery 
trajectory (expressed in terms of TIPW) is discretized into step functions. In addition, T = 
{𝑡h , 𝑡-, …, 𝑡S} is set such that 𝑡h ≤ 𝑡-  ≤ … ≤ 𝑡S , in which the difference between any 
adjacent time points is a constant time increment ∆t.  The recovery scheduling problem is 
to determine an optimal schedule 𝒙 = 	𝑥-, 𝑥i, ……𝑥n  (c = total number of damaged 
bridges) for the repair of all damaged bridges, where 𝒙 is the time at which restoration is 
initiated for bridges such that network SRT are minimized.   
The SRT for owner o can then be approximated by: 
𝑢@ 𝑥 = 	













 We can form the game as strategic form (or normal form), which is a way to 
describe a game using a matrix and is the appropriate description of a simultaneous game. 
The strategic form allows us to quickly analyze each possible outcome of a game. Figure 




Figure 6 Strategic form game 
 
 In Figure 6, if player 1 chooses strategy L and player 2 chooses strategy A, the set 
of payoffs given by the outcome is 𝑢-(𝐿, 𝐴) and 𝑢i(𝐿, 𝐴). The player, use a different 
schedule sequence as a strategy. If each bridge owner owns more than 2 bridges, the 
strategies of owners will be more than 2. Finitely repeated game should be considered. 
Writing down the strategy space for a repeated game is difficult, even if the game is 
repeated only two rounds. For example, consider the finitely repeated game strategies for 
Figure 7 to play twice. For player 1, 𝐿-	or 𝑅- are two possible moves in round one. For 
the second round, player 1 can pick whether to go 𝐿i	or 𝑅i. For the first−round strategies 
are: (𝐿-, 𝐴-	), 𝐿-	, 𝐵-	 , 𝑅-	, 𝐴-	 , (𝑅-	, 𝐵-). For the second−round, there are16 strategy 




Figure 7 Strategic form of a 2-round finitely repeated game 
 
 As long as there is a known, finite end, there will be no change in the equilibrium 
outcome of a game with unique equilibrium. SRT presents how efficient the repair is, 
each owner likely accepts the sequence of repair which can generate the minimum SRT. 
The recent research shows the different sequence of scheduling leads to unique results 
with high possibility (Zhang et.,al 2017a). Both players can achieve the minimum SRT 
by a specific repair sequence, and any change from either player, will change SRT. 
Therefore, the minimum SRTs will be the Nash equilibrium solution for the game. 
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Chapter 4: Numerical Example 
In this chapter, a high – level road-bridge network in Memphis of Shelby county 
in Tennessee is used for the model introduced in Chapter 3. This network based on 
interstate highways, contains 34 nodes, 46 edges and 24 bridges. There are two bridge 
owners in this network, State Highway Agency (Owner 1) and City or Municipal 
Highway Agency (Owner 4), which are marked in Figure 8. Owner 1 owns 16 bridges 
and Owner 4 owns 8 bridges.  
The chance of a moderate earthquake occurring in the New Madrid Seismic Zone 
(NMSZ) in the near future is high. Scientists estimate that the probability of a magnitude 
6 to 7 earthquake occurring in NMSZ within the next 50 years is higher than 90% 
(Hildenbrand et al., 1996). Shelby County, TN falls within the New Madrid Seismic Zone 
(NMSZ). However, most civil infrastructure in the NMSZ were not seismically designed, 
as opposed to those in frequent earthquake regions (e.g., California, USA or Japan). We 
consider a scenario earthquake with magnitude Mw equal to 7.7 and the epicenter located 
at 35.3N and 90.3W (on the New Madrid Fault Line) as proposed in the MAE Center 
study (Adachi, 2007). A selected ground motion attenuation model (Atkinson and Boore, 
1995) is used to estimate the peak ground acceleration at the site of the bridges. The 
earthquake scenario is simulated as mean realization.  
The genetic algorithm is used in this work to identify a near optimal solution with 




Figure 8 Memphis transportation network 
 
The network performance using TIPW is calculated according to Equation (6). 
Prior to the earthquake, the overall TIPW for the community is 1.752. After the 
earthquake happens, the TIPW for owner 1 is 0.5585 and for owner 4 is 0.5550. The 
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problem is to determine the schedule of repairing the 19 damaged bridges (which owner 
1 has 12 damaged bridges and owner 4 has 7 to minimize the SRT. The damaged level of 
bridges ranges includes slight, moderate, extensive and complete. In the recovery stage, 
for this case study we assume that only 4 bridges can be repaired simultaneously, which 
means that four available construction crews can do repair work.  
Table 3 SRT results from Nash equilibrium solution 
TIPW/Owner Owner 1 Owner 4 
TIPW before earthquake 1.7558 1.7415 
TIPW after earthquake 0.5585 0.5550 
 
 After earthquake, during the long-term stage III (recovery), we assume that every 
owner is eager to repair his bridges as soon as possible, but there are only 4 qualified 
construction crews available during the post-disaster. In order to determine the game 
theory paradigm, we assume that the bridge owners can distribute the resources evenly 
between them. Therefore, each owner can have two repair crews to do the work. 
First, we use genetic algorithm to search minimum values for both owners as a 
repeated game. Both owners know that the game is repeated and there is no regulation 
how to select the bridges. Their primary goal is to find the minimum owner specific SRT. 
Figure 8 shows the results of the genetic algorithm after searching for a global minimum 
SRT value without considering of bridge ownership. The SRT values of the repair 
schedule for both owners are 423.6501 (Owner 1) and 450.9705 (Owner 4). As we can 
see, there is no certain pattern in the sequence.   
After the optimal schedule is revealed to both player, we might consider the 
following scenarios: 
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1) Both owner agree on the optimal schedule and share the resources. 
Figure 9 and Table 4 are the result of this scenario. 
 
 
Figure 9 Optimal repair schedule for recovery of the network 
  
22 
Table 4 Scenario 1 optimal schedule result 
Bridge ID Owner Repair Time Idle Duration Resources 
201 1 3 0 crew #1 
308 1 13 0 crew #2 
251 4 3 0 crew #3 
350 4 4 0 crew #4 
196 4 3 3 crew #1 
617 1 2 3 crew #3 
475 1 184 4 crew #4 
419 1 573 5 crew #3 
515 4 678 6 crew #1 
507 1 277 13 crew #2 
390 1 709 188 crew #4 
551 1 267 290 crew #2 
467 1 3 557 crew #2 
345 4 303 560 crew #2 
456 1 12 578 crew #3 
231 1 3 590 crew #3 
574 4 10 593 crew #3 
383 1 12 603 crew #3 
294 4 233 615 crew #3 
 
2) Owner 1 does not agree on the optimal schedule and is not willing to 
share the resources. Owner 4 is willing to share the construction crews. 
For example, 4 construction crews are evenly distributed between two 
owners. Owner 1 has crew #1 and crew #2 work on his damaged 
bridges. And Owner 4 has crew #3 and crew #4 working for Owner 
4’s repair. Following the optimal repair schedule, when owner 4’s 
bridges is the next one on the schedule, but crew #3 and crew #4 both 
are occupied, owner 1 does not share the idle crews for owner 4. 
Owner 1’s bridge can move to the next one for repair. Figure 10 and 
Table 5 are the repair schedule based on this scenario. 
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Figure 10 Owner 4 shares resources 
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Table 5Scenario 2 result 
Bridge ID Owner Repair Time Idle Duration Resource 
201 1 3 0 crew #1 
308 1 13 0 crew #2 
251 4 3 0 crew #3 
350 4 4 0 crew #4 
196 4 3 3 crew #3 
617 1 2 3 crew #1 
475 1 184 4 crew #4 
419 1 573 5 crew #1 
515 4 678 6 crew #3 
507 1 277 13 crew #2 
390 1 709 188 crew #4 
551 1 267 290 crew #2 
467 1 3 557 crew #2 
456 1 12 560 crew #2 
231 1 3 572 crew #2 
383 1 12 575 crew #2 
345 4 303 578 crew #1 
574 4 10 587 crew #2 
294 4 233 597 crew #2 
 
3) Owner 4 does not agree on the schedule and is not willing to share the 
resources. Owner 1 is willing to share the construction crews. When 
owner 1’s bridges is the next one on the schedule, but crew #1 and 
crew #2 both are occupied, owner 4 does share the idle crews for owner 
1. Owner 4’s bridge can move to the next one for repair.  
25 
 
Figure 11 Owner 1 shares resources 
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Table 6 Scenario 3 result 
Bridge ID Owner Repair Time Idle Duration Resource 
201 1 3 0 crew #1 
308 1 13 0 crew #2 
251 4 3 0 crew #3 
350 4 4 0 crew #4 
196 4 3 3 crew #3 
617 1 2 3 crew #1 
515 4 678 4 crew #4 
475 1 184 5 crew #1 
345 4 303 6 crew #3 
419 1 573 13 crew #2 
507 1 277 189 crew #1 
574 4 10 309 crew #3 
294 4 233 319 crew #3 
390 1 709 466 crew #1 
551 1 267 552 crew#3 
467 1 3 586 crew #2 
456 1 12 589 crew #2 
231 1 3 592 crew #2 
383 1 12 595 crew #2 
 
4) Neither owner is not willing to share resources. Under this 
circumstance, if one owner has no crews available for his next bridges, 




Figure 12 Neither of owners share resources 
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Table 7 Scenario 4 result 
Bridge ID Owner Repair Time Idle Duration Resource 
201 1 3 0 crew #1 
308 1 13 0 crew #2 
251 4 3 0 crew #3 
350 4 4 0 crew #4 
196 4 3 3 crew #3 
617 1 2 3 crew #1 
515 4 678 4 crew #4 
475 1 184 5 crew #1 
345 4 303 6 crew #3 
419 1 573 13 crew #2 
507 1 277 189 crew #1 
574 4 10 309 crew #3 
294 4 233 319 crew #3 
390 1 709 466 crew #1 
551 1 267 552 crew#3 
467 1 3 586 crew #2 
456 1 12 589 crew #2 
231 1 3 592 crew #2 
383 1 12 595 crew #2 
 
 We can use matrix to present these four scenarios: 
 
Figure 13 Comparison of four scenaios result 
 
The result from Figure 13, illustrates that only when both owners are willing to 
share resources, the SRT will be minimum for both owners.  
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From this result, we can conclude that a non-cooperative and repeated strategic 
game can be considered for the network involving multiple decision makers.  Because 
different sequence of scheduling leads to unique result, this unique result, SRT is the 
equilibrium outcome of a game with a unique equilibrium. Decision-makers of the 
network should schedule and repair the damaged bridges based on sequence with 
minimum SRT values.  
  
30 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 This study is an exploration on applying game theory on schedule problems of 
road-bridge transportation network system. Under the assumption, which is that the 
community is well-funded and there are only certain number of construction crews 
available for the repairing, we propose that game theory component can be used in the 
schedule problem in the network involving multiple decision makers.  There are three 
contributions from this study: 
First, this study introduces a way to search shortest independent pathway for 
different decision makers of the network. A binary parameter is used to differentiate the 
performance metrics, TIPW. This parameter allows bridge owner to measure the 
performance of pathways which involves their bridges.  
Second, the repeated game model is considered to solve the recovery scheduling 
problem of transportation network for decision-making. Strategic and non-cooperative 
game was discussed, and the result from game model shows that Nash equilibrium 
solution can be found.  
Finally, this study defines the utility function, SRT for all players in the game. 
Instead of using recovery time, SRT can present the efficiency of repairing for different 
decision-maker of the network. This capability will allow the decision-maker to consider 
the efficiency of repair, not the length of recovery time.  
For the future research, the differential game can be considered for dynamic 
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